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The Sense of Commitment: A
Minimal Approach
John Michael*, Natalie Sebanz and Günther Knoblich
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
This paper provides a starting point for psychological research on the sense of
commitment within the context of joint action. We begin by formulating three desiderata:
to illuminate the motivational factors that lead agents to feel and act committed, to pick
out the cognitive processes and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit
commitments are in place, and to illuminate the development of an understanding of
commitment in ontogeny. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, we propose a
minimal framework, the core of which is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations
which can elicit a sense of commitment. We then propose a way of conceptualizing
and operationalizing the sense of commitment, and discuss cognitive and motivational
processes which may underpin the sense of commitment.
Keywords: commitment, joint action, cooperation, coordination, development
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of commitment is a cornerstone of human social life. Commitments make
individuals’ behavior predictable in the face of ﬂuctuations in their desires and interests, thereby
facilitating the planning and coordination of joint actions involving multiple agents (Michael and
Pacherie, 2014). Moreover, commitment also facilitates cooperation by making individuals willing
to contribute to joint actions to which they wouldn’t be willing to contribute if they, and others,
were not committed to doing so – to participate in a political demonstration, for example, or to
help clean up after the oﬃce Christmas party.
Despite the importance of commitment for characteristically human forms of sociality, it is not
well understood how people identify and assess the level of their own and others’ commitments, nor
what motivates them to honor commitments. In the following, our aim is to ﬁll in this gap. To this
end, we will develop a framework which speciﬁes, on the one hand, the cognitive and motivational
processes that lead people to sense that they or others might be committed and to act committed,
and on the other hand, the general structure of situations which elicit the sense of commitment, as
well as situational factors which modulate the sense of commitment.
It will be useful to begin with a few conceptual preliminaries. In particular, it is important to
distinguish among diﬀerent types of commitment. To this end, Herbert Clark (2006) has proposed
to taxonomize commitments according to their recipient. Thus, one can make a commitment
to oneself (self-commitments) or one can make a commitment to another agent (interpersonal
commitments). In what follows, we will put aside self-commitments and focus on interpersonal
commitments. Among interpersonal commitments, one can distinguish unilateral commitments
(in which case one agent makes a commitment to a second agent but the second agent is not
committed to anything) from mutual commitments (in which case she is also committed to
something). Furthermore, mutual commitments can be either complementary (as when Peter is
committed to digging a hole as long as Jim is committed to paying him for it) or joint (Peter and
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Jim are committed to a shared goal, such as digging the hole
together). In the context of joint action which will be our focus, it
is this latter kind of commitment (i.e., joint commitment) that is
most directly of interest.
What, if anything, do these diﬀerent types of commitment
have in common? According to a standard philosophical
conception of commitment, a commitment is a relation among
at least one committed agent1, at least one agent to whom the
commitment has been made, and an action which the committed
agent is obligated to perform because she has given an assurance
to the second agent that she will do so, and the second agent
has acknowledged this under conditions of common knowledge2
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Scanlon, 1998; Shpall, 2014). We
will refer to commitment in this standard philosophical sense
as ‘commitment in the strict sense’. For example, Susie has an
obligation to Jennifer to pick up the kids from school because
she (Susie) has expressed her willingness to do so, and Jennifer
has acknowledged this. In the canonical case, the expression is
eﬀectuated by means of the speech act of promising. Of course,
one can make a commitment (and indeed perform the speech act
of promising) without explicitly saying ‘I promise,’ but whether
one says ‘I promise’ or simply ‘yes’, the expression ‘will count
as and will be taken as a promise in any context where it is
obvious that in saying it I am accepting (or undertaking, etc.) an
obligation’ (Searle, 1969, p. 68).
This conception provides a clear characterization of paradigm
cases of commitment (i.e., commitments arising through
promises or other forms of assurance), and has proven to be
a fruitful starting point for normative discussions about the
kinds of obligations that arise within joint action (Gilbert, 1989,
2006a,b; Bratman, 1992, 1999). In this paper, however, our
aim is not normative but psychological – namely, to provide a
starting point for investigating the cognitive and motivational
processes that lead people to feel and act committed, and to
expect others to do so as well. In pursuing this aim, we hope
to contribute to the larger project of articulating ‘a cognitive
architecture that addresses the cognitive processes enabling
people to perform actions together. . . [one that] covers planning
1For simplicity’s sake, we will speak of one agent making a commitment. Thus,
we will bracket out the interesting question whether there are any systematic
diﬀerences between cases in which individuals enter into commitments and cases
in which groups do so.
2The concept of ‘common knowledge’ is a complex and contested one: according to
more stringent analyses (e.g., Lewis, 1969; Schiﬀer, 1972) P is common knowledge
for Susie and Jennifer if and only if Susie and Jennifer know that P, Susie knows
that Jennifer knows that P, and Susie knows that Jennifer knows that Susie knows
that P, and so on; and similarly for Jennifer. Thus, there is no commitment
in the strict sense if Susie mistakenly believes that Jennifer has not heard her
assurance that she will pick up the kids, or if Jennifer mistakenly believes that
Susie mistakenly believes this, etc. More recently, however, many researchers have
articulated less stringent analyses, which are intended to avoid the potentially
inﬁnite regress engendered by traditional analyses. Margaret Gilbert, for example,
oﬀers the following working deﬁnition: ‘if some fact is common knowledge between
A and B (or between members of population P, described by reference to some
common attribute), then that fact is entirely out in the open between them—and,
at some level, all are aware that this is so. Among other things, it would not make
sense for any one of these persons to attempt to hide the fact from another of their
number’ (Gilbert, 2006a, p. 121). Similarly, Carpenter (2009, p. 383) conceptualizes
common knowledge in the context of developmental psychology as ‘what is known
or has been experienced together,’ and suggests that having jointly attended to P is
suﬃcient in a broad range of cases.
for immediate actions, action monitoring and action prediction,
andways of simplifying coordination’ (Vesper et al., 2010, p. 998).
Our contribution to this project will be to explore what role
commitment may play in joint action understood broadly, i.e., as
‘any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals
coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a
change in the environment’3 (Sebanz et al., 2006, p. 70; for similar
deﬁnitions, see Vesper et al., 2010; Butterﬁll, 2012).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section “Three
Desiderata for a Psychological Account of the Sense of
Commitment,” we identify three desiderata for a theoretical
account of the sense of commitment in joint action. In Section “A
Minimal Framework,” we then introduce a framework designed
to address those three desiderata. The core of this framework
is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations which
can elicit a sense of commitment, and a set of factors which
can modulate the sense of commitment. We then characterize
the sense of commitment as the cognitive and motivational
processes that underlie agents’ abilities to identify and to respond
appropriately to that minimal structure and to those modulating
factors. In Section “Back to the Three Desiderata,” revisit the three
desiderata and show how the framework proposed here enables
us to address each of them.
THREE DESIDERATA FOR A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
SENSE OF COMMITMENT
The concept of commitment in the strict sense, to which we
referred in the previous section, provides a clear set of criteria
on which to base normative judgments. The account that we
will be developing here, in contrast, is of a psychological nature:
to provide a starting point for investigating the cognitive and
motivational processes that lead people to feel and act committed,
and to expect others to do so as well. In order to structure this
investigation, it will be helpful to specify three desiderata for a
psychological account of the sense of commitment in joint action.
Desideratum 1: Motivation
First, a psychological account of the sense of commitment should
illuminate the factors that lead agents to follow through on
commitments when alternative options arise that may be more
attractive than the actions to which they are committed. Thus,
if one makes a commitment to perform a particular action,
and one’s interests or desires subsequently change, it is not
immediately clear why one should remain motivated to fulﬁll
the commitment. Indeed, this issue is even more serious than
it appears at ﬁrst glance, insofar as the ﬂipside of motivation
is credibility: why should one agent expect some other agent
3This broad deﬁnition is in contrast to narrower deﬁnitions of ‘joint action,’
which have been formulated in contexts in which the aim is to specify uniquely
human forms of joint action, e.g., those involving ‘shared intentions’ (Gilbert,
1989, 2006a,b; Searle, 1990; Bratman, 1992, 1999). Given that we are interested
in cognitive and motivational processes underpinning commitment irrespective
of whether they are uniquely human or shared with other species, the broader
deﬁnition is more appropriate for our purposes.
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to remain committed to a particular action if that second
agent’s desires or interests change? If Sally makes a commitment
to Frank, which Frank does not think Sally is motivated to
fulﬁll, then it is diﬃcult to see why Frank should consider the
commitment to be credible and why he should expect Sally to
perform the action she is committed to. And if Frank cannot
rely on Sally’s commitment, then the commitment will not be
performing its function of stabilizing expectations and making
more accurate predictions possible.
The problem, then, is that in order for a commitment to
generate and/or stabilize expectations about an agent’s actions,
shielding them from ﬂuctuations in desires and interests, it must
somehow stabilize that agent’s motivations. In some cases, this
type of problem can be solved by externalizing commitments.
For example, Frank and Sally might sign a contract that entails
a daunting ﬁne for reneging on their commitment. This changes
the payoﬀ structure for the available action options, making
reneging a less attractive option than it otherwise would be. As
a result, both parties are motivated to stick to the planned course
of action, and each believes the other also to be so motivated.
Thus, it is easy to see how commitments can be motivated,
and therefore also credible, when they are externalized.4 But what
about cases where they are not externalized? We do not usually
sign contracts when agreeing to take a walk together. Yet people
often engage in and follow through on such commitments. Why
do they do so? A philosopher might reply by observing that
they do so because commitments give rise to obligations (Searle,
1969; Gilbert, 1989, 2006a,b). But what motivates people to act
as they are obligated to? A theoretical account of the sense of
commitment should illuminate the factors which motivate people
to honor commitments and which thereby make commitments
credible in everyday life – even in the absence of contracts5.
Desideratum 2: Implicit Commitment
Many commitments work not only without contracts but also
without explicit agreements or promises (Ledyard, 1995; Sally,
1995); they are implicit. But in the absence of an explicit
agreement or promise, or even any expression of one’s conditional
willingness to pursue a shared goal, it is unclear how people
determine when commitments are in place, and how they assess
the appropriate degree of commitment. To illustrate, consider
the following example, adapted from one discussed by the
philosopher Margaret Gilbert (2006b, p. 9): Two factory workers,
4As one reviewer has pointed out, one might doubt whether individuals acting to
avoid such penalties are acting out of commitment at all, given that they are acting
out of self-interest. In this vein, Sen (2002) has argued that commitment should
be distinguished sharply from preferences, since they can provide a motivation
to act in ways that fail to satisfy one’s preferences. For critical discussion of
Sen’s (2002) position, see Hausman (2005), who argues that a motivation to
honor commitments can and should be assimilated to rational choice theory
by conceptualizing it as a kind of preference (in the broad sense of ‘all-things-
considered-rankings’ of choices). The present contribution builds uponHausman’s
analysis be attempting to identify the conditions under which a motivation to
honor (explicit or implicit) commitments is elicited, as well as the psychological
mechanisms underpinning such a motivation.
5To be clear, we do not want to argue that this concern about motivation is a
reason to reject Gilbert’s account. Indeed, the explanation that we will oﬀer of
the motivation to honor commitments may be seen as ﬁlling in a gap in Gilbert’s
account.
Polly and Pam, are in the habit of smoking a cigarette and talking
together on the balcony during their afternoon coﬀee break. The
sequence is broken when one day Pam waits for Polly but she
doesn’t turn up. In this case, there has been no explicit agreement
to smoke a cigarette and talk together every day, and yet one
might nevertheless have the sense that an implicit commitment
is in place, and that Polly has violated that implicit commitment.
This will depend on further details about the case. For example,
if Polly and Pam have smoked and talked together every day for
2 or 3 weeks, Polly might feel only slightly obligated to oﬀer an
explanation, but she would likely feel more strongly obligated if
the pattern had been repeated for 2 or 3 years. Thus, it seems that
mere repetition can give rise to an implicit sense of commitment.
Similarly, one agent’s reliance on a second agent may give rise to
an implicit sense of commitment on the part of the second agent.
If, for example, Polly and Pam always use Polly’s lighter, and
Pam at some point even stopped bringing her own lighter, then
Polly’s absence will completely undermine Pam’s goal of enjoying
a pleasant cigarette break. In such a case, both parties are likely to
think that an explanation, and perhaps even an apology, is all the
more in order. Thirdly, one agent’s investment of eﬀort or other
costs in a joint action may also give rise to an implicit sense of
commitment on the part of a second agent. If Pam, for example,
must walk up ﬁve ﬂights of stairs to reach the balcony where
she and Polly habitually smoke together, Polly’s implicit sense of
commitment may be greater than if Pam only had to walk down
the hall.
In sum, there are many situational factors which can give
rise to and/or modulate an implicit sense of commitment. The
concept of commitment in the strict sense does not provide
any basis for identifying these factors. Indeed, the concept of
commitment in the strict sense does not provide any grounds
for expecting that the sense of commitment could be modulated
in a graded fashion. This is because the concept of commitment
in the strict sense is binary: either an assurance has been given
and acknowledged under conditions of common knowledge, or it
hasn’t.
Let us emphasize that the question of primary importance for
psychology here is not whether or when implicit commitments
should be counted as genuine commitments. Rather, the main
concern is what factors lead people to feel and act committed, and
to expect the same of others. It seems to us to be a striking feature
of human sociality that people often feel and act committed, and
expect the same of others, even when they would deny that any
obligations or entitlements are in place. A psychological account
of the sense of commitment should illuminate this feature.
Desideratum 3: Development
The third desideratum pertains to the ontogenetic origins of
commitment. Speciﬁcally, if one conceptualizes commitment as
philosophers have traditionally done (Searle, 1969; Gilbert, 1989,
2006b; Shpall, 2014), it is questionable whether commitment is
applicable to young children. This is because the strict sense
of commitment put forward by Gilbert (1989, 2006b), Searle
(1969), and other philosophers presupposes an understanding of
common knowledge: an agent only undertakes a commitment to
contribute to a joint action if she expresses her willingness to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1968
Michael et al. Minimal Commitment
do so to some other agent, who acknowledges that expression
under conditions of common knowledge. Although one should
be wary about ascribing the requisite cognitive sophistication
to understand these kinds of conceptual relations to very
young children, there is evidence that very young children
may in fact understand and respond to commitments in some
sense.
By 18 months, children can solve joint problem-solving tasks,
in which two agents must perform complementary actions at
the same time in order to achieve a joint goal, such as pulling
at opposite ends of a tube in order to open it up and retrieve
the stickers hidden inside, (Warneken et al., 2006). These tasks
implement a general structure in which it would be natural for the
agents, if they were adults, to sense that an implicit commitment
were in place: since each individual action is only eﬃcacious if
the other action is also performed, each agent is implicitly relying
on the other to contribute her part. It is interesting to note,
then, that when the experimenter abruptly abandoned the joint
action, many of the 18 month-olds attempted to re-engage him.
The authors in fact suggested that this ﬁnding is evidence that
the children understood that the experimenter was committed to
the joint action and therefore obligated to continue until it was
completed to both parties’ satisfaction.
Following up on this study, Gräfenhain et al. (2009)
compared a condition in which the experimenter made an
explicit commitment to the joint action and a condition in
which she simply entered into the action without making
any commitment. Interestingly, 3 year-olds, but not 2 year-
olds, protested signiﬁcantly more when a commitment had
been violated than when there had been no commitment. In
Experiment 2 of the same study, the tables were turned and the
children were presented with an enticing outside option that
tempted them to abandon the joint action. The children were less
likely to succumb to the temptation if a commitment had been
made. In cases in which they did succumb, they were more likely
to ‘take leave,’ to look back at the experimenter nervously, or to
return after a brief absence. In a study by Hamann et al. (2012),
one child received her part of a joint reward from a joint task
before her partner received the other part, thus tempting her to
abandon the joint task before her partner received her reward.
Most of the children nevertheless remained engaged, suggesting
that they sensed an obligation to remain engaged until both
achieved their goal6.
One interpretation of these ﬁndings is that children, contra
the aforementioned theoretical reservations, do understand
commitments in the strict sense by around 3. While this may
well be correct, there are also ﬁndings indicating that a high
degree of caution is warranted here. Consider a study conducted
by Mant and Perner (1988), in which children were presented
with vignettes describing two children on their way home from
school, Peter and Fiona, who discuss whether to meet up and
go swimming later on. In one condition, they make a joint
commitment tomeet at a certain time and place, but Peter decides
6This was compared to a condition in which the ﬁrst child received the reward
before the joint task even began, i.e., there was no collaboration at all, and therefore
no sense of commitment. In this condition, the children were signiﬁcantly less
likely to assist the second child in attaining her reward.
not to go after all, and Fiona winds up alone and disappointed.
In the other condition, they do not make a joint commitment,
because Fiona believes that her parents will not let her. She is
then surprised that her parents do give her permission, and she
goes to the swimming pool to meet Peter. In this condition, too,
however, Peter decides not to go after all, so again Fiona winds
up alone and disappointed. The children in the study, ranging
from 5 to 10 years of age, were then asked to rate how naughty
each character was. The ﬁnding was that only the oldest children
(with a mean age of 9.5) judged Peter to be more naughty in the
commitment condition than in the no-commitment condition.
This may seem late, but it is in fact consistent with the ﬁndings
of a study by Astington (1988), who reported that children under
9 fail to understand the conditions under which the speech act of
promising gives rise to commitments7.
In view of the unclear pattern of ﬁndings, we propose the
following approach to modeling the developmental trajectory.
Rather than taking the normative notion of commitment
in the strict sense as a starting point, and interpreting the
ﬁndings of Gräfenhain et al. (2009; cf. also Hamann et al.,
2012) as evidence that 3 year-olds understand and respond to
commitments in the strict sense, we will attempt to identify a less
complex phenomenon that young children may understand and
respond to even in the absence of a sophisticated understanding
of common knowledge, obligations, and the speech act of
promising. Our more psychological approach (i.e., in contrast
to an approach based on normative notions) resonates with the
view of many theorists that a simpliﬁed conception of joint action
is needed in order to account for young children’s engagement
in joint actions (Tollefsen, 2005; Brownell et al., 2006; Butterﬁll,
2012).
A MINIMAL FRAMEWORK
The Minimal Structure of Commitment
and the Sense of Commitment
In addressing the three desiderata identiﬁed in the previous
section, our starting point will be a characterization of the
minimal structure of situations in which a subjective sense of
commitment can arise. This minimal structure can be expressed
as follows:
(i) There is an outcome which an agent (ME) either desires to
come about, or which is the goal of an action which ME is
currently performing or intends to perform. We will refer to
this outcome as ‘G’ (for ‘goal’).
7For example, many of the children mistakenly judged that one can promise
to bring about an event over which one has no control, and thereby commit
oneself to bringing that event about. It must be noted that these earlier studies
cannot be directly compared with Gräfenhain et al. (2009) study: not only did
they use diﬀerent measures, but they also implemented scenarios in which the
children were asked to make judgments from a third-person perspective, which
may be intrinsically more diﬃcult than a ﬁrst-person perspective. For present
purposes, however, the relevant point is that the ﬁndings from these earlier studies
give us reason to be cautious, and thus provide initial motivation for a thinner
interpretation of Gräfenhain et al. (2009) ﬁndings.
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(ii) The external contribution (X) of a second agent (YOU) is
crucial8 to bringing about G.
Clearly, conditions (i) and (ii) specify a broader category than
that of commitment in the strict sense. Nevertheless, situations
with this structure may elicit a sense of commitment on the part
of one or both agents. We propose to conceptualize the sense of
commitment as follows:
ME has a sense that YOU is committed to performing X to the
extent that ME expects X to occur because (i) and (ii) obtain.
YOU has a sense of being committed to performing X to the
extent that YOU is motivated by her belief that ME expects her to
contribute X.
While the minimal structure is speciﬁed such that only one
agent (ME) desires G and/or has G as a goal, there are many cases
in which both agents desire G and/or have the goal G. In those
cases, the commitment may be mutual, with each agent having a
sense of being committed as well as a sense that the other agent is
committed.
It is also worth emphasizing that the two agents (ME and
YOU) may diﬀer with respect to their sense of commitment.
Thus, ME may have a sense that YOU is committed even though
YOU does not have a sense of being committed. Or YOU may
have a sense of being committed even though ME does not have
a sense that YOU is committed.
As already stated, conditions (i) and (ii) specify a broader
category than that of commitment in the strict sense. In
particular, while commitments in the strict sense arise
intentionally (Gilbert, 1989), an agent can come to have a
sense of commitment to doing X without performing any
intentional action at all. Consider the following example. If Carla
is running to catch the elevator and the door is beginning to
close, and Victor is standing in the elevator, Carla may have a
sense that Victor is committed to pressing the button to keep
the door open simply, because he is standing next to the button
and pressing it would be a crucial contribution to her goal. And
Victor may have a sense that he is committed to doing so simply
because he believes that Carla expects him to.
Moreover, there are also many cases in which a sense of
commitment is triggered as a side eﬀect of an intentional action.
For example, Sam is cleaning up the living room and picks up
a ball that had been lying on the ﬂoor. As it happens, his dog
Woofer notices this and bounds over to him, apparently ready
to play fetch. Sam was not intending to play fetch and does not
particularly desire to, but may now feel obliged to, because he
has generated an expectation on the part of Woofer that they
will now play fetch together. Thus the unintentional generation
of expectations can lead individuals to sense that a commitment
is in place. Of course, if Sam intentionally makes eye contact
with Woofer and waves the ball around in the air, he thereby
generates a high degree of commitment to playing fetch. And if
Woofer is sensitive to these cues, they may lead him to have a
high expectation that Sam is now going to play fetch with him.
Another necessary feature of commitment in the strict sense
which can be absent in instances in which a sense of commitment
8In saying that the contribution is crucial, wemean that it is a necessary component
of a particular strategy for bringing about G.
is elicited is common knowledge. As already noted above,
commitment in the strict sense requires that it be common
knowledge that at least one agent (i.e., whoever is taking on
the commitment) has expressed her willingness to perform an
action. A sense of commitment, in contrast, can arise without any
such expression becoming common knowledge. Recall Gilbert’s
example of Polly and Pam, who are in the habit of smoking and
chatting on the terrace each day during the coﬀee break, though
they have never made an agreement to do so:
‘The sequence is broken when one day Pam waits for Polly but
she doesn’t turn up. The day after this, Polly comes up to her
and apologizes for her absence: ‘I was oﬀ sick.’ ‘I wondered what
happened,’ says Pam, accepting her apology. ‘Glad you’re back.’
By this time, it would seem, it is common knowledge between the
parties that each has expressed to the other her readiness jointly
to commit with the other to uphold the practice of their meeting
daily outside the factory for a smoke and a chat. At no point
did the parties agree to start or engage in this practice. Yet their
interchange suggests enough has passed between them jointly to
commit them to uphold it’
(Gilbert, 2006b, p. 9).
The exchange on the day after Polly’s absence is required in
order to generate a commitment in the strict sense, since it is only
through this exchange that each party’s willingness to participate
in the joint action has been expressed under conditions of
common knowledge. However, the example also illustrates that
a sense of commitment may be in place prior to that exchange
(and that it may lead Polly to consider it appropriate to oﬀer an
explanation and Pam to consider it appropriate that Polly do so).
As the situation has been described, it is natural to think that
it is actually quite clear to both parties that both are willing to
sustain the interaction pattern, and that they have merely not
bothered to express this willingness. But we may also imagine a
scenario in which this is not the case, and in which one or both
parties nevertheless have a sense of commitment. For example, if
we imagine that they have only smoked and chatted together two
or three times, Polly may be unsure as to whether Pam wants to
continue the pattern and/or as to whether Pam thinks that Polly
wants to continue the pattern, etc. In this scenario, Pollymay have
a sense that she is committed to showing up despite the absence
of common knowledge about each other’s willingness to continue
the pattern.
This modiﬁcation of Gilbert’s example also serves to highlight
a further important diﬀerence between commitment in the strict
sense and the sense of commitment: the latter, in contrast to the
former, is a graded phenomenon. As we observed in discussing
this example earlier on (see section “Desideratum 2: Implicit
Commitment”), it illustrates that the sense of commitment can
be modulated in a continuous fashion by subtle factors, such
as repetition, reliance, and the investment of costs. Having
characterized the sense of commitment in terms of expectations
and motivations,9 we are now in a position to explain this
9It is important to emphasize that the account does not identify the sense of
commitment with just any expectations and motivations but with expectations
and motivations pertaining to the contribution of X in situations instantiating the
minimal structure.
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gradedness: expectations and motivations come in degrees. Thus,
any factors which raise ME’s expectation that YOU will perform
X and /or YOU’s motivation to perform X in instances in which
the minimal structure is implemented, raise ME’s and YOU’s
sense of commitment (or both). In addition, the factors which
are necessary for commitment in the strict sense but not for the
sense of commitment (e.g., YOU having intended to raise ME’s
expectation of X, this being common knowledge, etc.) may also
serve to raise motivations and/or expectations, and thus function
as factors modulating the sense of commitment.
In sum, we have observed that a sense of commitment may
be elicited in many situations which instantiate the minimal
structure speciﬁed above but in which there is no commitment
in the strict sense. We have also observed that the sense of
commitment, in contrast to commitment in the strict sense,
is a graded phenomenon, and may be modulated by various
factors (such as repetition, reliance, and the investment of costs)
which serve to raise ME’s expectation of X and/or to make that
expectation more salient to YOU.
In this section, we have proposed to conceptualize the sense of
commitment in terms of agents expecting external contributions
(i.e., X) to be made because the minimal structure is in place
[i.e., conditions (i) and (ii)], and/or being motivated to make
contributions because they believe they are expected to. In order
to establish the plausibility of this proposal, it will be necessary
for us to explain why anyone would have such expectations
and/or motivations. In the next subsection, we will address the
question as to why some agents may sometimes expect X to
occur because (i) and (ii) obtain. The next step, in subsection
“Why Would YOU Be Motivated to Contribute X Because ME
Expects YOU to?,” will be to address the question as to why some
agents may sometimes be motivated to contribute X because
they believe that they are expected to. Then, in subsection “How
the Sense of Commitment Can Stabilize Expectations,” we will
explain how these expectations and motivations can reinforce
each other over time, and thereby fulﬁll the social function of
commitment, namely to stabilize agents’ expectations about other
agent’s making contributions to their goals or to outcomes they
desire.
Why Would ME Expect X Because the
Minimal Structure is Instantiated?
Our conjecture is that the expectation that X will be contributed
in cases instantiating the minimal structure has the status of
a default in some agents, in particular in humans. When an
agent detects that X is a crucial contribution to an outcome
she desires or to a goal she is or will be pursuing (i.e., G), it
may trigger a default expectation that X will occur. This, we
hypothesize, is because goals are represented fundamentally in an
agent-neutral manner – i.e., as outcomes that are to be brought
about, irrespective of whose goals they are (Vesper et al., 2010;
Butterﬁll, 2012). As a result, if a state of aﬀairs is represented as a
goal, then the default assumption is that it will be brought about
in the most eﬃcient way possible, with all crucial contributions
being made. In other words, an agent will not initially consider
the possibility that G may be only her own goal, or an outcome
that only she desires to be brought about. Hence, such a default
expectation could play the functional role of commitment in the
sense of generating or reinforcing speciﬁc expectations that ME
would not otherwise have about contributions (X) to be made
to ME’s goals or to outcomes which ME desires to be brought
about (G).
A default expectation that others will contribute X in cases in
which the minimal structure is instantiated would be consistent
with many experiences that infants and young children have in
their ﬁrst years of life. Indeed, as soon as infants begin pursuing
goals, there is usually at least one parent who is motivated to
support them in their goals. Moreover, infants experience distress
or conﬂict when their goals are not met. Once they are able to
detect that they are dependent on external contributions for some
goals, instances in which they fail to meet a goal because a crucial
contribution is not made may also elicit signs of conﬂict.
Furthermore, the notion of agent-neutral goal representation
also suggests a more general reason why a default expectation of
crucial contributions to one’s goals may be sustained throughout
childhood and adulthood. This is because, when YOU perceives
ME acting toward a goal (G), YOU may also come to represent
G in an agent-neutral fashion. If YOU does this, then she may
simply treat it as being equivalent to other goals that she has
rather than assigning it speciﬁcally to ME. As a result, the goal
may ‘slip’ from perception into action, and YOU may perform
X simply because G is now the goal to which she is currently
contributing, not because it is ME’s goal. We use the term ‘goal
slippage’ to refer to this process. A slightly diﬀerent way of
thinking about goal slippage is that YOU’s identiﬁcation of the
goal may lead her to expect that it will be brought about, and
she may have a preference for things to go as she expects them
to go. In Bayesian terms, one might formulate this by saying
that YOU’s identiﬁcation of the goal raises the probability that
G will occur, and leads YOU to go into active inference in order
to ensure that G occurs and that prediction error is thereby
minimized (cf. Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). For example, if YOU
has just taken the aisle seat on an airplane, and a passenger then
approaches with the apparent goal of sitting down in the window
seat, YOUmay just spring up ormove her legs to the side in order
to facilitate the achievement of this goal. Although an agent’s
motivation to bring about such goals may generally be lower
than her motivation to bring about internally generated goals,
goal slippage could nevertheless increase the likelihood of YOU
doing X.
Though we are not aware of any evidence directly bearing
upon the hypothesis of goal slippage, there is one body of
research that is relevant to consider in this context – namely,
the work done in recent years on spontaneous instrumental
helping behavior in young children and non-human primates
(e.g., Warneken et al., 2006; Liszkowski et al., 2007). In a typical
scenario, an agent attempts to reach for an object, such as a
pencil, which is out of her reach but within reach of the test
participant. In Warneken et al. (2006) study, it was found that
18 month-old infants and chimpanzees tended to help the agent
in this type of scenario. This seems to indicate that infants
and chimpanzees have a tendency to engage in spontaneous
instrumental helping – i.e., they may have an altruistic preference
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to support others in their goals. In line with this interpretation,
it turned out that oﬀering further rewards did not increase
the helping behavior, suggesting that the helping behavior was
motivated by a genuinely altruistic preference.
Nevertheless, the notion of goal slippage indicates an
alternative (or complementary) explanation for these ﬁndings.
Speciﬁcally, it raises the possibility that the test participants may
simply represent the goal in an agent-neutral manner, and thus
treat it equivalently to other goals of their own. In Bayesian terms,
one might say that they predict that the agent will reach the pencil
and help in order to reduce the prediction error. One way to
test this hypothesis would be to investigate whether the children
would persist in contributing to the goal even if the other agent
ceased to pursue the goal or became distracted by an alternative
option.
Why Would YOU Be Motivated to
Contribute X Because ME Expects
YOU to?
In the previous section, we oﬀered an explanation of why ME
may sense that YOU is committed in instances in which the
minimal structure is instantiated, i.e., why ME may sometimes
expect X to occur because (i) and (ii) obtain. Now we will turn
our attention to the question as to why YOU may sense that she
herself is committed in instances in which the minimal structure
is instantiated, i.e., why YOU may sometimes be motivated to
contribute X in instances in which the minimal structure is
instantiated because YOU believes that she is expected to.
Our conjecture is that a tendency to be motivated to fulﬁll
others’ expectations about one’s contributions to their goals or
to outcomes which they desire (i.e., a preference for expectation
fulfillment) has the status of a default in humans. As Heintz et al.
(in preparation) have argued, such a preference may serve as
a proximal mechanism for reputation management. Moreover,
insofar as YOU believes that ME expects X to occur, YOU may
expect ME to show signs of conﬂict if X does not occur, and
indeed to address YOU directly with these signs of conﬂict. For
example, if the fellow passenger has tossed her book onto the
window seat and then backed up into the aisle and cleared space
for YOU to stand up and get out of her way, then YOUmay infer
that ME has a speciﬁc expectation about what YOU will do and
sense that the path of least resistance is to fulﬁll that expectation.
There is some evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis
of a default preference for fulﬁlling others’ expectations. First of
all, it is one possible explanation of the ﬁnding that people behave
more generously in economic games when images of faces or
eyes are present (Francey and Bergmüller, 2012; cf. also Bateson
et al., 2006). It is also a plausible explanation of the robust ﬁnding
that people tend to give away money in anonymous one-shot
dictator games (i.e., when an experimenter seems to expect them
to) but do not just go around handing out money in everyday
life (Camerer, 2003). This suggestion ﬁts well with the ﬁndings
from a classic study by Gaertner (1973), in which a confederate
called people on the telephone asking for money to help him
out of a diﬃcult situation. Political liberals were more likely to
help than political conservatives – but only if they stayed on
the phone long enough to hear his request, and in fact liberals
were more likely to hang up sooner. These ﬁndings support two
important claims: ﬁrst of all, that people have a tendency to feel
pressured into fulﬁlling others’ expectations; and secondly, that
they accordingly try to avoid learning of others’ expectations in
order to avoid being pressured into carrying out actions they
do not want to carry out. Of course, this study involved a
direct and explicit request for money, which is diﬀerent from
the cases of implicit expectations that we have been focusing
on here. It could be interesting to modify this paradigm in
order to investigate whether and to what degree people also feel
pressured to fulﬁll implicit expectations. More recently, Dana
et al. (2006) designed a dictator game in which the participant
playing the role of dictator could pay $1 in order to exit from
the dictator game, i.e., accepting a $9 payoﬀ instead of being in
a situation in which they could choose either to keep $10 for
themselves or to give away as much as they wanted to. Many
of the participants did indeed choose this option, but not in a
condition in which they were told that the other person (the
receiver) was unaware that she was a potential receiver in a
dictator game. This suggests that making people aware of others’
expectations makes them more likely to be cooperative. But does
it reduce uncertainty? In other words, would one person be more
conﬁdent that another person would cooperate with her if she
could make her expectations known to him? To our knowledge,
there is no data that bears directly on this question, but it could
be tested by, for example, oﬀering the receiver in a dictator
game an exit option (e.g., $2) either privately or publicly (i.e.,
such that the dictator is aware of it). We would predict that
receivers would be more likely to refuse such an exit option
if the dictator were aware of it. Indeed, we would also predict
that dictators would be willing to pay some amount in order
to prevent the receiver’s decision being common knowledge,
i.e., to strategically avoid being confronted with others’ salient
expectations.
The hypothesis of a default preference for expectation
fulﬁllment also suggests a further possible interpretation of the
spontaneous instrumental helping behavior that we discussed
in the previous section. Speciﬁcally, the children in these
scenarios may infer that they are expected to help and have a
default preference to fulﬁll expectations that they take others
to have of them. In Warneken et al. (2006), experiments,
the adult experimenter performed actions that were not only
highly unlikely to lead to their apparent goals but also highly
ineﬃcient. So it would be rational for the infants to infer that
the experimenter is expecting them to help. This interpretation
would be supported if it could be shown that making the other
agent’s expectation more salient increased the helping behavior
(e.g., if the agent announced to some third party that she expected
the participant to help, or if she made eye contact with the
participant).
How the Sense of Commitment Can
Stabilize Expectations
In the previous two subsections, we explained why some agents
may sometimes expect X to occur because (i) and (ii) obtain,
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and why some agents may sometimes be motivated to contribute
X because they believe that they are expected to. In this
section, we will explain how these expectations and motivations
can reinforce each other over time, and how the sense of
commitment can thereby stabilize agents’ expectations about
other agent’s making contributions to their goals or to outcomes
they desire.
On the one hand, ME’s default expectation that others (such
as YOU) will contribute to ME’s goals will be likely to be
met and reinforced if other agents (such as YOU) are indeed
likely to contribute because of the processes referred to in
the previous two subsections (goal slippage and expectation
fulfillment). On the other hand, YOU will be more likely to
contribute X if YOU believes that ME expects this (expectation
fulfillment).
This does not imply, of course, that children or adult humans
always expect others to contribute X in situations instantiating
the minimal structure, nor that they always contribute X when
they think they are expected to. In many, such instances in
which an agent expects X, X simply does not occur. Indeed, even
infants’ and young children’s parents don’t always support their
goals or fulﬁll their desires. So, in order to diﬀerentiate among
various degrees of likelihood that X will co-occur, children must
develop a more nuanced sensitivity to features of interactions
that carry information about the reliability of various kinds of
cues to X in various situations. By the same token, it would be
ineﬃcient for an agent always to contribute to others’ goals or
desired outcomes whenever she believed that she were expected
to. Hence, it would be useful for an agent to develop more
stringent criteria for making crucial contributions to others’ goals
or desired outcomes.
Thus, it is likely that children progressively become sensitive
to subtler factors. For example, we hypothesize that children
become progressively sensitive to the factors referred to in
Section “The Minimal Structure of Commitment and the Sense
of Commitment” as being necessary for commitment in the
strict sense (Did the other agent do something to raise the
child’s expectation of X? If so, was it intentional? Is it common
knowledge that the agent has expressed her willingness to
do X?), and that these factors increasingly come to modulate
children’s sense of commitment. In addition, their motivations
and expectations are likely to become increasingly sensitive to
other modulating factors, some of which we also discussed
brieﬂy in Section “The Minimal Structure of Commitment and
the Sense of Commitment” (e.g., How often has the agent
repeated the contribution of X so far? To what extent is the
agent relying on X for the achievement of G?). Finally, the
processes which we have postulated as underpinning a sense
of commitment (goal slippage and expectation fulfillment) are
likely to become calibrated through experience to match those
of other people in their culture, and to conform to cultural
norms concerning when it is considered appropriate to make
contributions to others’ goals and to expect contributions
from others. As a result, people’s expectations about the
extent to which others will be motivated by such processes
will roughly match the extent to which others really are so
motivated.
BACK TO THE THREE DESIDERATA
As we have already emphasized, the minimal structure of
commitment is less restrictive than that of commitments in
the strict sense. Thus, it accommodates many cases that do
not qualify as commitments in the strict sense. We used this
characterization of the minimal structure as a starting point for
discussing the cognitive and motivational processes constituting
a sense of commitment. With this conception of a sense of
commitment in hand, we will now revisit the three desiderata
identiﬁed in Section “Three Desiderata for a Psychological
Account of the Sense of Commitment” and explore what our
minimal approach enables us to say about each (i.e., Motivation,
Implicit Commitment, Development).
Revisiting Desideratum 1: Motivation
The minimal approach raises two important points about
motivation. Firstly, the processes of goal slippage and expectation
fulﬁllment can go some way toward increasing motivation as well
as credibility. On the one hand, the default expectation that others
will contribute (X) to one’s goals will be more likely to be met and
reinforced if other agents are indeed more likely to contribute,
either through goal slippage or through expectation fulﬁllment.
And on the other hand, agents will be more likely to believe
that one expects them to contribute X if one indeed expects
by default that they will do so. Thus, the very detection of the
minimal structure would tend to reduce both the real uncertainty
and the perceived uncertainty about crucial contributions being
made.
Secondly, the sense of commitment can derive motivational
force by engagingmoral emotions and sentiments. For example, if
an agent (YOU) does not contribute X in a situation instantiating
the minimal structure, this may cause her to feel ashamed or
guilty, and it may cause others to become angry or contemptuous.
And since she and everyone else anticipate these emotional
consequences, and everyone knows that they are undesirable
outcomes that she is motivated to avoid, her commitment
is credible, so she succeeds in generating expectations. The
anticipated emotional consequences of honoring or reneging on
commitments change the payoﬀ structure of action options in a
way that parallels contracts: just as contracts reduce uncertainty
by making particular action options highly unattractive, the
anticipated emotional outcomes of commitment violations
make particular action options unattractive and thereby reduce
uncertainty about what actions agents will choose.10 It is worth
pointing out that even in the absence of negative emotional
outcomes of violating commitments, the risk of damage to one’s
reputation is also a strong motivating factor in favor of honoring
commitments. But the likelihood of negative emotional outcomes
if one fails to honor a commitment may well serve to enhance
this motivation. Moreover, it may serve as a useful heuristic for
assessing the likelihood of reputation loss, and the avoidance of
negative moral emotions may even be an important proximal
mechanism for reputation management.
10This idea is adapted from Frank (1988; cf. also Michael and Pacherie, 2014).
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Revisiting Desideratum 2: Implicit
Commitment
Our minimal approach oﬀers a straightforward explanation of
how agents identify, and assess the level of, their own and
others’ implicit commitments: namely, they track the minimal
structure of commitments (as well as various modulating factors,
such as those discussed in Section “The Minimal Structure of
Commitment and the Sense of Commitment”). In some cases,
agents will not only have a sense that an implicit commitment
is in place but will indeed judge that it is appropriate to
expect contributions to be made – as may be the case, for
example, if Polly and Pam have smoked and chatted together
every afternoon for many years. When this is the case, then
that judgment may even serve to stabilize expectations and
motivations further.
In other cases, as we have observed, people act as though they
or others were committed evenwhen they would not in fact judge
that a commitment is in place – as with Sam reluctantly playing
fetch with Woofer. While it may be argued that the widespread
tendency to act as though committed in such cases, and to expect
others to do likewise, is simply misguided, it nevertheless remains
a highly characteristic feature of human social life that cries
out for an explanation. Indeed, by situating such cases along a
continuum with cases of commitment in the strict sense, the
minimalist approach reveals this tendency to be an important key
to identifying the processes that lead people to engage in and to
expect cooperative behavior.
Revisiting Desideratum 3: Development
An understanding of commitment in the strict sense does not
come out of nowhere. Rather, it is constructed on the basis of the
minimal structure through an increasingly nuanced sensitivity to
subtler factors. Developmental ﬁndings provide support for the
assumption that children are sensitive to the minimal structure
by the second year of life (they are motivated to contribute X in
such situations and they protest when others fail to). Later on,
children also become sensitive to the other factors referred to in
Section “TheMinimal Structure of Commitment and the Sense of
Commitment,” and thereby develop an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of commitments over the course of childhood and
early adolescence.
In addition, the minimal approach sheds light on an otherwise
mysterious pattern in the developmental ﬁndings. Recall that, in
Gräfenhain et al. (2009) study discussed above, the main ﬁnding
was that 3 year-olds, but not 2 year-olds, protest more over
the experimenter’s abandonment of the joint action when the
experimenter has made an explicit agreement to play together
(commitment condition) compared to when she has not made
an explicit agreement (no commitment condition). Interestingly,
it is not the case that the 2 year-olds do not protest at all,
and only the 3 year-olds understand the situation well enough
to feel entitled to protest. On the contrary, the 2 year-olds
protest just as much in both conditions as the 3 year-olds do
in the commitment condition. This suggests that the sense of
entitlement that inspires protest over an unfulﬁlled expectation
is not the product of developmental changes over the third year
but, rather, it is the default that is already in place by 2 or earlier.
What changes in the third year is that children learn that they
are not always entitled to expect contributions to their goals.
In other words, the developmental process chips away from,
rather than adding to, the cognitive architecture that underlies
the protest behavior. Moreover, in the Mant and Perner (1988)
study discussed above, one interesting detail is that 22 of the 46 six
year-olds actually rated the protagonist as being naughty in both
conditions (while 11 rated him as neutral in both conditions),
i.e., when Peter had violated a commitment and thereby caused
Fiona to be disappointed and sad, and when he had not made any
commitment in the ﬁrst place and Fiona had been disappointed
and sad. It is as though, whenever a goal is not achieved and actors
are left disappointed, the default is to assign blame, and to work
out the details later. Indeed, this is just the pattern that one would
expect on the basis of the minimal approach presented here.
The minimal approach spells out several factors that
could drive children’s emerging sensitivity to commitment.
Investigating these factors with existing developmental tasks (e.g.,
Gräfenhain et al., 2009, 2013; Hamann et al., 2012) will allow
us to explain in more detail the nature of children’s emerging
understanding of commitment. For example, the minimal
approach generates the prediction that children’s tendency to
remain engaged and to expect engagement can be inﬂuenced by
ostensive cues such as eye contact and motherese (Csibra and
Gergely, 2009). Crucially, these cues were present in Gräfenhain’s
et al. (2009) ‘joint commitment condition’ but not in the ‘no
joint commitment condition’. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out
that 3 year-olds’ diﬀerential responses in those two conditions
may have been due to such ostensive cueing rather than to any
verbal expression of commitment per se. Moreover, the account
oﬀered here suggests the possibility that children’s motivation to
remain engaged and expectation of engagement from others may
be inﬂuenced by various other cues or intentional actions that
typically signal an intention to cooperate. For example, young
children’s tendency to cooperate and to expect cooperation from
others may be enhanced just as much if another agent simply
announces to a third-party that she intends to share the spoils of
a joint action as it is if she makes an explicit verbal commitment
to the child to do so.
In sum, the minimalist approach helps to explain how an
understanding of commitments emerges through engagement in
joint actions rather than arguing that it is present as soon as
children engage in joint actions.
CONCLUSION
We began by formulating three desiderata: to identify the
motivational factors that lead agents to feel and act committed,
to pick out the cognitive mechanisms and situational factors
that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in
place, and to illuminate the development of an understanding
of commitment in ontogeny. In order to meet these three
desiderata, we proposed a minimal framework, the core of
which is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations
which can elicit a sense of commitment. We then proposed
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a way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the sense of
commitment, and discussed cognitive andmotivational processes
which may underpin the sense of commitment. Finally, we saw
how the expectations and motivations making up the sense of
commitment can reinforce each other over time, and thereby
fulﬁll the social function of stabilizing agents’ expectations about
other agent’s making contributions to their goals or to outcomes
they desire.
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